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BITING THE BULLET: TWO PROPOSALS
TO STEM THE TIDE OF GUN VIOLENCE
Firearms have accounted for a disturbingly high rate of violent
crime, injury, and death in the United States. Nearly two-thirds
of all murders in recent years have been committed with fire-
arms.' In addition, experts attribute approximately 16,000 sui-
cides2 and 2,000 accidental deaths per year to firearms.' While
these facts alone might be sufficient to convince public officials to
act, too often the resulting debates over gun control proposals
elicit more heated controversy than enlightened solutions.4 Even
those states and municipalities that have enacted some form of
gun control legislation have witnessed few positive results from
their labors.5
The reasons for this futility are widely debated. 6 Some commen-
tators note that localities have little chance of stopping the
proliferation of firearms when neighboring and distant localities
I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI, UNIFoRM CRnvm REP. FOR THE UNITED STATES 12 (1990). In
actual numbers, of the 23,438 murders in 1990, over 64%, or 15,000, involved firearms. Id.;
see also Markus Boser, Go Ahead, State, Make Them Pay: An Analysis of Washington,
D.C.'s Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs.
313, 315 n.33 (1992).
2 See Boser, supra note 1, at 318 (citing Susan P. Baker, Without Guns, Do People Kill
People?, Am. J. OF PuB. HEALTH, June 1985, at 587). The author notes that firearms were
involved in twenty percent of the injury-related deaths in 1982, killing 33,000 people.
Boser, supra, at 318.
3 See Boser, supra note 1, at 316 (citing The Gun Control Debate, Introduction, at 12). In
all, in Senator Moynihan's estimate, firearms cause nearly 175,000 casualties each year.
139 CONG. REc. S612 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) [hereinafter
Moynihan]. But see Paul Cotton, Gun Associated Violence Viewed Increasingly as Public
Health Challenge, 26 JAMA 1171, 1172 (1992) (estimating 70,000 people hospitalized dur-
ing 1988 as result of gun-related injuries); Scott D. Dailard, The Role of Ammunition in a
Balanced Program of Gun Control: A Critique of the Moynihan Bullet Bills, J. LEGis. 19, 20
(1994). With regard to total gun-related deaths, Dailard notes that "[m]ore than 60,000
Americans lost their lives to guns during the past two years alone-more than the number
of casualties sustained by American forces during the Vietnam War." Id.
4 See Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. Rzv. 53, 63 (1992)
(characterizing gun control debate as "unproductive"). The author argues: "The rules of
intellectually honest debate are ignored" when the issue is gun control. Id. Further, the
author blames both gun control advocates and opponents alike for the lack of informed
debate on the issue. Id.
5 See Craig Wolff, In New York, the Brazenness of Illegal Gun Dealers Grows, N.Y. TMES,
Nov. 6, 1990, at B1 (noting New York City, with its stringent gun control laws, has one of
highest rates of firearms-related violence).
6 See infra notes 7-9 (describing shortcomings of gun control measures).
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have lax regulatory laws.7 Others blame the federal government's
failure to enact comprehensive national gun control legislation.'
Regardless of the cause, it seems that no amount of gun control
legislation has worked, or will work in the foreseeable future, due
to the high volume of guns already in circulation, and their ex-
treme durability.9 As a result, it seems that measures aimed at
firearms themselves can have only a cumulative, longterm impact.
Proposals affecting ammunition, however, may have a much
greater immediate impact, since bullets are not reusable and only
a short term supply currently exists.' °
To that end, United States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan"
has sought to radically alter the terms of debate on one of the ma-
jor issues of the day. Senator Moynihan has consistently sought
to inject new, unconventional perspectives into public policy mat-
ters.12 Moynihan is known for such innovative proposals as the
"negative income tax,"13 welfare reform, 1 4 and Social Security re-
7 Boser, supra note 1, at 313. The author states: "[Of the 8500 handguns police recov-
ered in [Washington,] D.C. between January 1988 and December 1990, seventy percent
came from neighboring Maryland and Virginia." Id. (citing Rene Sanchez & Barry Silent,
House Skeptical Over D.C. Gun-Liability Bill, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1990, at Cl); see also
GERALD D. ROBIN, VIoLENT CRrME AND GUN CONTROL 22-23 (1991). Robin attributes New
York City's firearm crime rate to "leakage" from Southern states. Id. Robin also noted that
studies have found, in tracing a sample of handguns, that only 5% were originally
purchased in New York and 25% came from South Carolina alone. Id. The problem of"leak-
age" is not unique to New York. Id. Other states with tough gun control laws, such as
Massachusetts and Michigan, have experienced similar difficulties. Id. at 21.
8 See Dailard, supra note 3, at 19. The author, after describing the harm caused by fire-
arms, notes "[although these statistics should kindle outrage in a stone, they have failed to
rescue the issue of firearm violence from legislative inertia. Congress has not intervened
with comprehensive gun control legislation for over 25 years." Id. at 21.
9 See Dailard, supra note 3, at 21. "Weapon-based strategies which seek to remove cer-
tain problematic firearms from the marketplace are... futile given the vast inventory of
arms already currently deployed in the society at large.. . ." Id. "There are some 200 mil-
lion firearms in circulation. The pistol is a simple machine, and with minimal care it re-
mains working for centuries." Moynihan, supra note 3, at S613. It is estimated that, by the
year 2000, there will be 100 million handguns in the United States. Windle Turley, Manu-
facturers' & Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41, 41 (1982).
10 See Moynihan, supra note 3, at S613 (regarding bullet supply).
11 See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJiFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992, at 836
(1991). Moynihan, a Democrat from New York, was first elected in 1976. Id.
12 See infra notes 13-15 (describing Moynihan's positions on other major issues).
13 See DANIEL P. MoYNrHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 124 (1973) [herein-
after GUARANTEED INCOME]. As an ideological alternative to the welfare programs of the
time, the "negative income tax" was a measure touted by conservatives. Id. at 50. It was
intended to replace many (if not all) of the federal bureaucratic regulations involved in the
receipt of welfare benefits and sought to provide a guaranteed minimum income for all
needy American families. See M. KENNETH BowLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED INCOME PRO-
POSAL: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN PoLIcY CHANGE 2-3 (1974). Moynihan was considered
one of "the welfare experts" in the country, id. at 62, and favored a system for providing
cash benefits to the poor. Id. at 49. The Nixon Administration's proposal, known as the
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form.15 His latest proposal concerns one of today's most conten-
tious issues-gun control. 16
While advocates from both conventional perspectives, particu-
larly those who favor or oppose limits on firearms, 17 have focused
on controls on the firearms 18 themselves, Senator Moynihan has
proposed regulating the most deadly part of the firearm-the am-
munition.' 9 In statements on the Senate floor, Senator Moynihan
Family Assistance Plan, also included a related initiative, called the Supplemental Secur-
ity Income ("SSI") program. Id. at 1. Ultimately, the Family Assistance Plan was defeated
in the United States Senate, though the SSI was enacted. Id. at 147.
14 See GUARANTEED INCOME, supra note 13, at 543. In 1968, Moynihan argued that there
had been no serious attempt on the part of the nation's political leaders to address what he
considered "a crisis in welfare." Id.; see also DANIEL P. MOYNmHAN, THE CRISIS IN WELFARE,
TnE PUBLIC INTEREST 4 (1968). Moynihan stressed the need for "a thorough reassessment of
public welfare," proposing instead a guaranteed annual income to replace the public assist-
ance programs of the time, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").
Id.
15 See David E. Rosenbaum, Congressional Leaders Take Issue with Moynihan Plan to
Cut Taxes, N.Y. TrMEs, Jan. 22, 1990, at B7 (explaining details of tax proposal).
16 See infra notes 23-27 (describing Moynihan's proposal).
17 See Joyce Lee Malcolm, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional
Right by Stephen P. Halbrook, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 452, 454 (1986) (book review) (recog-
nizing that "collection of armed individuals or an entire armed population pose a clear
threat to a ruler... a threat more potent... than any posed by the freedom of speech,
assembly, or the press"). But see Paul Weiss, Why Do They Shoot, N.Y. TamsS, Sept. 11,
1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 86 (quoting Tanya I Metaksa, Executive Director of National
Rifle Association's Institute for Legislative Action). '"The person who wants to get a gun...
is going to get [it] one way or another ... [s]o if you make [firearms] illegal, he'll figure out
another way." Weiss, supra, at 86. The NRA argues that guns are an established right
under the Second Amendment to the Constitution and that the government has failed to go
after the real problem - criminals. Id. at 66. Such conventional perspectives generally
confront bans on assault weapons. See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional
Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 59, 77-79 (1989). "Legislation banning or se-
verely restricting the possession and sale of semiautomatic firearms is unconstitutional."
Id. at 78. The author argues that semiautomatic legislation is appealing to many because it
uses the "misnomers 'assault weapon' or 'assault rifle.'" Id. He proposes that a clear dis-
tinction should be made between assault rifles, which are fully automatic, and semiauto-
matic weapons. Id. The failure to do so, according to Dowlut, creates a debate where "misin-
formation... can only lead to bad policy." Id. Other debates on gun bans have focused upon
"Saturday Night Specials." See Hattie Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health
Methodologies to Prevent Youth Violence, 103 YALE L.J. 1885, 1905 (1994) (arguing that if
such guns, which cost approximately forty dollars, were generally less available, children
would have less access to them or more expensive guns, due to their lower income). Still
others argue for limitations on the ability to obtain most weapons, such as those imposed
by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which mandates a five to seven day wait-
ing period for all purchases of firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1) (1993).
'8 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (deciding that purpose of
amendment, to assure effectiveness of militia, must be considered); Stevens v. United
States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding Second Amendment applies only to mili-
tia, not to individual right to bear arms); State v. Owenby, 826 P.2d 51, 52-53 (Or. 1992)
(finding that right to bear arms is not absolute; state legislature may limit firearms within
auspices of its police power).
19 See 139 CONG. REC. S16,931-01 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
Moynihan noted: "Guns don't kill people; bullets do." Id. (quoting comedian Pat Paulsen).
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has noted that the nation has a 200-year supply of firearms,20 but
that with current inventories, 21 gun owners have only a four-year
supply of ammunition.22
The Moynihan proposal 23 seeks to tax specific deadly forms of
ammunition at a rate that would make them prohibitively expen-
sive.24 Since a firearm without ammunition is nearly useless as a
25weapon, the tax proposal would effectively disarm persons who
would otherwise possess these particularly heinous bullets.
This Note will address two unique proposals intended to reduce
gun violence. Echoing the concerns of Senator Moynihan, these
proposals will focus on the regulation of ammunition. With ballis-
tic "improvements" of new ammunition outpacing society's ability
to pay for consequential damage inflicted by these bullets, it is
clear that something must be done to properly apportion the bur-
dens ammunition places on society.
Part One will address the Moynihan proposal which would im-
pose, inter alia, a 10,000 percent tax rate on certain forms of am-
munition. This Part will include an historical overview of the fed-
eral government's attempts to tax items out of existence, the
20 139 CONG. REc. S16,931-01, S16,932 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han). Implicitly, any curb on the production of weapons likely would prove fruitless as a
short-term solution to the supply of guns on the street, since a properly maintained firearm
will outlive its owner and perhaps much longer. Id, Moynihan argues that "the life of a
handgun seems to be measured in decades, generations, even centuries." Id. So, too, a ban
on the possession of weapons may have a limited impact, since searching out and seizing
concealable (and even nonconcealable) weapons would stretch law enforcement capabilities
to the breaking point and prove nearly impossible. Id. Moynihan then distinguished be-
tween guns and ammunition. Ammunition is easier to regulate because there are few man-
ufacturers and a shorter supply whereas there are 200 million guns in the United States.
Id. at S16,932.
21 139 CONG. Rc. S612, S613 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
There are currently an estimated 7.5 billion rounds of ammunition in the United States. Id
22 1& Moynihan noted that ammunition is consumed at a rate of two billion rounds per
year. Id. Therefore, assuming no further production, and no change in the rate of usage, the
current supply would be depleted within approximately four years. Id.
23 The Real Cost of Handgun Ammunition Act, S. 1616, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The
Moynihan bill was formally introduced at 139 Cong. Rec. S14,958-01, S14,958 (daily ed.
Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Moynihan Proposal].
24 See Tax & Tax & Tax: Make Killer Ammo Impossible to Buy, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneap-
olis-St. Paul), Nov. 8, 1993, at 10A. Moynihan proposes taxes on ammunition that would
range from eleven to fifty percent, except on killer bullets such as the 9mm Black Talon,
which would have a 10,000% tax raising the price per box to as much as $150,000. Id.
25 See 139 CONG. REC. S16,931-01 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement by Sen. Moynihan).
Although an unloaded gun may still impel a victim's compliance to a criminal's act, it can
only harm a potential victim to the extent that it can be used as a blunt object. See Dailard,
supra note 3, at 24. "Gun owners will surely realize, as the Senator [Moynihan) does, that
their weapons are only useful so long as they are loaded." Id.
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judiciary's reaction to such attempts, and the potential Fifth
Amendment takings ramifications of such excessive taxes.
Part Two will explore the possible expansion of strict liability in
tort to manufacturers and sellers of particular forms of ammuni-
tion. It will discuss the variety of ways the federal and state
courts, as well as the federal and state governments, may impose
strict liability upon the manufacturers and sellers of ammunition.
This Note will conclude that by expanding the areas of strict lia-
bility in tort, combined with the enacting of restrictive tax meas-
ures, public officials can successfully address the need for gun con-
trol and the desire to make the innocent victims of gun-related
crime whole.
I. THE MoYNmHAN PiRoPosAL
Senator Moynihan's proposal, entitled the "Real Cost of Hand-
gun Ammunition Act" (the "Handgun Ammunition Act"),26 seeks
to raise the manufacturers' tax, with limited exceptions, on the
sale of all handgun ammunition from the current rate of eleven
percent to fifty percent. 27 In addition, for certain forms of ammu-
nition designed for greater destructive capability, the tax rate
would be amended from eleven percent to 10,000 percent.28 The
stated purposes of the Handgun Ammunition Act are: 1) to in-
crease revenues earmarked for the funding of a health care plan;
29
2) to redistribute the cost of health care for gunshot wounds to the
26 S. 1616, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Moynihan also proposed companion legislation
that would ban the same ammunition this bill seeks to tax. 139 CONG. REc. S19,5612-02
(daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993).
27 139 CONG. REc. S14,958-102 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993). The most frequently used ammu-
nition for target shooting and sporting competitions is the .22 caliber rimfire, which would
be exempt from the tax increase. Id. In addition, the proposed Act makes no attempt to
alter the tax rate on rifle ammunition. Id. Nor does it apply to ammunition purchased for
police or military purposes. Id. at S14,959. The current manufacturer tax was first enacted
in 1918 and has withstood judicial inquiry. Id. at S14,958.
28 Id. The particular bullets at issue in the Moynihan proposal are the 9mm Talon and
the .50 caliber Desert Eagle. Id. The Talon is a recently designed bullet, developed to
expand[ ] to expose razor-sharp reinforced jacket petals. These cut tissue in the wake
of the penetrating core. Toward the end of the bullet travel, the Talon bullet typically
turns sideways. From this point on, it penetrates soft tissue like a throwing star-very
nasty; very effective; a real improvement in handgun ammo.
Id. at S14,958-S14,959 (citation omitted) (quoting Handguns for Sport & Defense Maga-
zine, Nov. 1993.
29 See Moynihan Proposal, supra note 23, at S14,958. At the time, Moynihan expected to
produce revenues for the Universal Health Care Plan submitted by President Bill Clinton.
Id. As to which of the many proposals in Congress, if any, that will be enacted and funded
by this or any other tax scheme, it is far too early to determine. See Adam Clymer, Moyni-
han Asks Big Tax Increase on Ammunition, N.Y. TtmEs, Nov. 4, 1993, at Al.
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industry and the taxpayers "responsible" for such wounds;30 and
3) to effectively prohibit the manufacture and sale of certain types
of ammunition to the general public.3 Finally, the proposal would
also raise the fees for licensing of handgun ammunition manufac-
turers and importers from $10 per year to $10,000 per year.32
The proposal drew a terse response when it was presented in a
Senate Finance Committee hearing to Treasury Secretary Lloyd
Bentsen.33 The National Rifle Association was far less reserved in
30 See Clymer, supra note 29, at Al, B20. Senator Moynihan has stated that producing
revenue is less important than "bring[ing] the cost of ammunition in line with the cost it
imposes on society." See Ronald Smothers, A Tax Debate Focuses on Destruction Science,
N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 7, 1993, at 22. For a more detailed discussion of the level of "responsibil-
ity" attributable to the firearms industry, see Boser, supra note 1; Philip Oliver, Rejecting
the "Whipping-Boy" Approach to Tort Law: Well-Made Handguns are Not Defective Prod-
ucts, 14 U. ARm Lrrr L ROCK L.J. 1, 2 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of gun owner
"responsibility", see Ann-Marie White, Comment, A New Trend in Gun Control: Criminal
Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 Hous. L. Rxv. 1389, 1390 (1993).
31 See Clymer, supra note 29, at Al. Moynihan also sponsored a bill that banned armor
piercing ammunition in 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 922(aX7) (1993); Moynihan Proposal, supra note
23, at S14,959. The three goals of the legislation would seem, at least in relation to the
10,000% tax scheme, in conflict. Id. Presumably, a de facto ban on some forms of ammuni-
tion would tender little, if any, revenues for health care, or any other program for that
matter. See Smothers, supra note 30, at 22. This does not mean, however, that the 50% tax
would not increase revenues substantially. A 50% tax, without a dramatic drop in con-
sumption, would provide much in the way of new revenue. See Clymer, supra note 29 at Al
(quoting Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen). In all, Senator Moynihan estimates that his
proposal would generate about $200 million per year for the health program. New Tune in
Health Plan Debate: Raise the Funds and Tax the Ammunition, STAR TamuNE (Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul), Nov. 4, 1993, at 7A. However, Senator Moynihan also noted: "I'm not sure that
I really care" how much money the tax raises, as long as it helps get weapons off the
streets. Id.
32 See Moynihan Proposal, supra note 23, at S14,959. The license requirement was es-
tablished in 1938 and the annual fee (or "occupational tax") imposed at that time was $10.
Id. This tax has never been increased. Id. A similar "occupational tax" of $10,000 has been
imposed on the manufacturers and importers of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and
similar weapons. Id. Neither the current tax mentioned above nor the proposed tax would
apply to manufacturers who deal exclusively with police departments, the military, and
other government entities. Id.
33 See Clymer, supra note 29, at Al. The proposal was presented to Treasury Secretary
Bentsen on Nov. 3, 1993 during Finance Committee hearings on the President's Health
Care Plan. Id. Bentsen unenthusiastically responded: "Obviously that is a source of reve-
nue that could be examined, and we will consider it." Id. at B20. By all accounts, the Clin-
ton Administration was reluctant to antagonize yet another interest group in its efforts to
enact a comprehensive health care plan. See id. at Al. Historically, gun and ammunition
control measures have been met with staunch and usually effective opposition from the
National Rifle Association and other pro-gun groups. See Moynihan Proposal, supra note
23, at S14,959. Coupled with the multimillion dollar lobbying effort employed by groups
opposing elements of the Clinton health plan, the Administration did not wish to seek out
another target. See generally Clinton Rejects Linking Bullet Tax, Health Reform, PHIADEL-
PMA INQUIRER, Nov. 11, 1993, at A16 (describing President Clinton's concern that revenues
from such tax would be limited); Adam Clymer, National Health Program, President's
Greatest Goal, Declared Dead in Congress, N.Y. TIEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (discussing, in
series of articles, wide scope of interests involved in formulating national health care plan).
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their reply, calling the proposal "laughable."3 4 Nevertheless, when
such a proposal is made by the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, it warrants attention.
35
A. Excessive Taxation
As Chief Justice John Marshall noted in the landmark case of
McCulloch v. Maryland,36 "the power to tax involves.., the power
to destroy."37 Nevertheless, the congressional power to tax, as de-
scribed in the Constitution,38 contains few limitations.3 9 Perhaps
wary of Marshall's concerns, Congress exercised its taxing power
infrequently through the 1880's.40 Indeed, when Congress first
sought to institute an income tax in 1894,4 ' the Supreme Court
held that the act violated the Apportionment Clause of the Consti-
tution.42 Until 1937, however, Congress frequently sought to regu-
34 Clymer, supra note 29, at B20. The article quoted NRA Executive Vice President
Wayne LaPierre: "I seriously doubt anyone in America believes crime is going to go down
because taxes are going to go up. It shows how eggheaded this whole debate has become."
Id.
35 See id. at Al. For an analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Moyni-
han proposal, see Scott D. Dailard, The Role of Ammunition in a Balanced Program of Gun
Control: A Critique of the Moynihan Bullet Bills, 20 J. LEGIS. 19 (1994).
36 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,436-47 (1819) (holding Maryland statute authorizing tax upon
Bank of United States to be unconstitutional under Supremacy Clause).
37 Id. at 326.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The power to tax was granted to Congress "to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... "
Id.
39 See, e.g., id. "All Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration... ." Id. Indeed, many cases speak of
Congress's right to tax as "unlimited," Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 269 (1901), "exhaus-
tive," Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916), "absolute," McCulloch, 316
U.S. at 430, or "comprehensive," Helvering v. Griffith, 318 U.S. 371, 411 (1943) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
40 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 542-43 (1869). The Court recounted
every direct taxes imposed by Congress, enumerating only four in the first 70 years of the
nation. Id. In each instance, the sum of the tax was apportioned among the states and
assessed by the subjects of the tax. Id. at 543. These subjects were limited to "lands, im-
provements, dwelling-houses and slaves." Id.
41 DANIEL Q. Posin, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 36 (2d ed. 1993). The first federal income
tax was instituted in 1862 due to the tragedy of the Civil War. Id. When the war ended the
tax was reduced and eventually repealed in 1872. Id. Pressures to raise revenue through
taxation eventually led to Congress's passage of the Income Tax of 1894. Id. This 2% tax on
individual income over $4,000 and 4% corporate tax only reached those individuals with
the highest income at the time. Id.
42 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 555, 582-83 (1895) (finding want
of equality and uniformity invalidates tax), modified, 158 U.S. 601, 633. The Court held the
tax to be a direct tax under the Constitution and, consequently, void because the tax was
not apportioned by population. 158 U.S. at 637. As a result, Congress ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment, offering the federal government the right to tax income "without apportion-
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late certain economic activities through its taxing power when the
activity otherwise fit within the commerce power.48
1. Historical View of Taxing Power
One of the clearest examples of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the congressional taxing power was in McCray v. United
States," which also serves to illustrate Congress's propensity for
regulatory taxes.45 In McCray, Congress imposed a high tax on all
licensed retailers of artificially colored oleomargarine, effectively
rendering the retail sale of the product too expensive to compete
with natural butter.46 The plaintiff in the case, a licensed retail
dealer of yellow oleomargarine, also objected to the fact that Con-
ment" and "without regard to any census or enumeration." See generally PoslN, supra note
41, at 36-37.
43 See generally Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941). Congressional authorization for economic regulations
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, had been
undermined by numerous Supreme Court rulings throughout the early part of the Twenti-
eth Century. See Posm, supra note 41, at 1-8 (explaining cases holding that direct taxes
were unconstitutional if not apportioned). But see Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-19. The power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause was not confined to regulation among the states. Id.
The Court stated that this power extended to instrastate activities that affect interstate
commerce, making regulation the appropriate means to a legitimate end. Id. at 115.
44 195 U.S. 27 (1904). For an early decision laying out the Congressional power to tax,
see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869) (holding that Congress had
power to tax state bank notes, even if act "taxed] oppressively"). The Court stated that
while Congress might be inclined to "tax oppressively," it is responsible to the people, and
not the courts, for such actions. Id. at 548. This judicial philosophy pervades nearly all of
the tax litigation that has appeared before the Court. See infra notes 45-52, 56-59. But see
infra note 54.
The Court did, however, state that Congress's power to tax would be abused "if so exer-
cised as to impair the separate existence and independent self-government of the States, or
if exercised for ends inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the Constitution." 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) at 541. The Moynihan proposal arguably could be attacked as inconsistent
with the limitations placed on the government under the Second Amendment. See Dowlut,
supra note 17, at 59. As this Note does not seek to entertain an all-encompassing discussion
of the Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment, this Note will only comment on
this perspective by noting that the Court has previously upheld other federal, as well as
state, limitations of an individual's right to obtain and possess guns. See United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
4 See R. ALTON LEE, A HisTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 215 (1973). The author notes
that the imposition of taxes for the purposes of regulating or abolishing products or activi-
ties was part of a "tremendous increase in national governmental powers." Id. "By the lat-
ter part of the nineteenth century the power to tax had been established and used in a
broad manner to raise revenue, to assist in carrying out other powers, and regulate activi-
ties or commodities." Id. at 8.
46 McCray, 195 U.S. at 29. According to the Court record, only butter made in the spring
has a naturally deep yellow color. Id. Even natural butter produced at other times of the
year is pale in its coloration. Id. As a result of consumer demand, all natural butter pro-
duced was supplemented eventually with a coloring ingredient to mirror the natural color
of spring butter. Id. This coloration did not change the taste of the product, nor was it
injurious to the consumers' health. Id.
1994] BITING THE BULLET
gress "arbitrarily" chose to impose a far lower tax on noncolored
oleomargarine while colored natural butter was not taxed at all.
4 7
The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the tax,
stated that statutes, which on their face impose excise taxes, are
so obviously within congressional power "as to require only [their]
statement."41 Operating on the assumption that the primary ob-
jective of the statute was to raise revenue, the Court held that
when Congress exercises its power within the limits of the Consti-
tution,49 it is not for the Court to determine whether the act is
unwise or injurious.5 0 In addition, the Court expressed its reluc-
tance to examine a "wrongful purpose or motive" on the part of
Congress in implementing the taxing power.51 The Court, how-
ever, did leave open the possibility of critically examining future
tax schemes.52
While the Court scrutinized federal and state economic regula-
tions during the early twentieth century, 53 particularly those in
47 Id. at 28-29. Neither type of natural butter was taxed. Id. However, noncolored oleo-
margarine, that did not resemble butter, was taxed at a low rate of 1/4 of a cent per pound
and artificially colored oleomargarine, which served as a butter substitute, was taxed at a
rate of ten cents per pound. Id.
48 Id. at 50 (citing Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 619 (1902); Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41, 92 (1900); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899); In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 536
(1897)).
49 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 54-56 (1904); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 4 (discussing limitations on power to tax).
50 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 54-56 (1904) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)). "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity
with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are... the
sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse .... ." 195 U.S. at
56.
51 McCray, 195 U.S. at 56. The Court stated that the judiciary may not interfere with the
lawful exercise of power on the assumption that there is a wrongful underlying motive. Id.
Quoting from Spencer v. Merchant, 126 U.S. 345 (1888), the Court stated that, "[t]he judi-
cial department cannot prescribe to the legislative department limitations upon the exer-
cise of its acknowledged powers." McCray, 195 U.S. at 58 (quoting Spencer, 126 U.S. at
355).
52 McCray, 195 U.S. at 64. The Court conceded:
[1]f a case was presented where the abuse of the taxing power was so extreme as to be
beyond the principles which we have previously stated, and where it was plain to thejudicial mind that the power had been called into play, not for revenue, but solely for
the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently
with the principles of freedom and justice upon which the Constitution rests, that it
would be the duty of the courts to say that such... was the exercise of an authority not
conferred.
Id.
63 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down statute limiting
number of hours bakers could work per week as illegitimate exercise of federal government
in conflict with Constitution). Lochner is seen by many commentators as the ushering in of
a laissez-faire era of the Court regarding economic regulations. See Derrick Bell, Race and
Class, Law and Politics: We Are Not Saved, 69 B.U. L. REv. 457, 462 n.9 (1989); John Wal-
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Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., otherwise known as the "Child La-
bor Tax Case,"54 and Hill v. Wallace,5 5 some commentators have
noted that there are numerous extra-judicial factors involved in
these decisions, which limit the true impact of their holdings.56
2. Modern Trends
Other cases, such as United States v. Doremus in 1919, 57 Son-
zinsky v. United States5 8 in 1937, and United States v. Sanchez59
lace, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism, and Poli-
tics in Casey, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 187, 220-22 (1994).
For a further discussion of the Court's impact on economic regulations, see WnLiAm B.
LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMEmcAN CoNSTrrUION § 2, at 221-23, (7th ed. 1991) (exemplifying
when Court substituted its judgment for Congress's or state legislatures'); Nelson Lund,
Congressional Power over Taxation and Commerce: The Supreme Court's Lost Chance to
Devise a Consistent Doctrine, 18 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 729, 746-48 (1987) (describing in-
stances where scrutiny of Congress's intent is necessary); see also Wallace, supra, at 222-
23. In the wake of the Depression, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared he would
use all the government's powers to resuscitate the economy. Id. at 222. Numerous elements
of Roosevelt's New Deal package of economic legislation were declared unconstitutional. Id.
54 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (striking down tax clearly designed to penalize and discourage the
use of child labor in manufacturing). The tax measure stated, in pertinent part:
Section 1200. That every person... operating ... (b) any mill, cannery, workshop,
factory, or manufacturing establishment situated in the United States in which chil-
dren under the age of fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or
children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen have been employed or permitted to
work more than eight hours in any day or more than six days in any week.., shall pay
for each taxable year ... an excise tax equivalent to 10 per centum of the entire net
profits received or accrued for such year from the sale of such mine, quarry, mill, can-
nery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment.
Id. at 34-35. The tax scheme, transparent in its intent to circumvent a prior ruling of the
Court, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), was held to be a tax intended to regu-
late an area otherwise outside the proper function of the federal government, in this case
the Tenth Amendment right of a state to regulate commerce and contractual relations
within its own borders, and could not be sustained. Id. at 41.
55 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (declaring federal law, imposing tax on contracts for sales of grain
for future deliveries while exempting those sales made on boards of trade, unconstitu-
tional). In Hill, the Court held that the tax was clearly intended as a detailed regulation of
a matter solely within the police power of the states. Id. at 66-67. The Hill Court distin-
guished the holdings in Veazie Bank and McCray from those in Hill and Bailey by stating
that "in none of those cases did the law objected to show on its face, as did the Child Labor
Tax Law, detailed regulation of a concern or business wholly within the police power of the
State, with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such regulation." Id. at 67.
56 See Lund, supra note 53, at 746-48. The author suggests that the Court may have
decided Bailey as it did less for reasons of sound judicial thinking, and more for reasons of
spite at Congress's attempted circumvention of the Court's ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
Id. The author also examines the similar reasoning used by the Court to decide Bailey and
Hill. Id. at 746. The author further describes how the Court espoused a narrow view of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. Id. at 746-48. As for a view of the taxing power, the
Court did not consider it to be so critical an issue as to articulate what the limits of this
power might be. Id. at 747 n.97.
57 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding Narcotic Drug Act requiring anyone involved in produc-
tion, sale, or distribution of opium or cocoa leaves to pay $1 per year special tax).
5 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding conviction on violation of federal statute imposing tax
on firearms dealers). The Sonzinsky Court noted that congressional exercise of the taxing
power is no less valid if the tax burdens or restricts or suppresses the thing taxed. Id. at
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in 1950, essentially upheld and extended the discretion of congres-
sional taxing power asserted in McCray. Following this line of
cases, congressional taxing activities are immune from judicial re-
view, even if the tax scheme is intended to be regulatory, rather
than revenue producing.6 0
Presently, Congress's power to tax whatever it chooses, at
whatever rate it chooses, is nearly unlimited. 61 In essence, there
need be only a "rational relation" between the tax scheme and the
reasons for imposing the tax in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter.62 With regard to the Moynihan proposal, Congress's legiti-
mate end would presumably be the right to regulate interstate
commerce for the purposes of protecting the health and safety of
United States citizens, and the means of providing such protec-
tion, by imposing prohibitively high tax rates, would be rationally
related to that end.6 3 The likelihood that the proposal would col-
lect little in the way of revenue, or that its intention is not, in fact,
to raise revenue, are issues that the courts have held to be beyond
their purview and not to be questioned.64 Therefore, it seems
likely that the courts would uphold the Moynihan proposal if
enacted.
513 (citing Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 548 and McCray, 195 U.S. at 60-61). The Court
stated further: "[We] will not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the
regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to
exercise another power denied by the Federal Constitution." 300 U.S. at 514.
59 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (upholding Federal Marihuana Tax Act, which imposed tax of
$100 per ounce on transfers of marihuana unless special tax of $1 to $24 per ounce was
paid). Citing Sonzinsky, the Court noted that a tax will still be valid in spite of the fact that
it "regulates, discourages or even definitely deters the activity taxed." Sanchez, 340 U.S. at
44. The Court noted that the validity of the tax did not depend on whether the revenue
obtained was negligible (citing Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513) or whether its revenue purpose
was secondary. 340 U.S. at 44 (citing Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928)).
60 See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44; Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513; Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93. It is
important to realize, however, that none of the cases above dealt with a 10,000% tax. How-
ever, whether such a rate would make a difference, based on the analysis offered in this
Note, is open to speculation.
61 See LocxHART ET AL., supra note 53, at 116. The authors note that no federal tax with
a regulatory effect has been invalidated since 1935. Id.
62 See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). The rational basis test requires
that the challenged law bear a reasonable relationship to the attainment of some legitimate
governmental objective. Id.; see also Robert J. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 261, 281 (1990) (noting that, without evidence suggesting discrimina-
tory purpose, courts should examine tax practices using rational basis test).
63 See 139 CONG. REc. S195-02, S612 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han). Moynihan noted: "These bills represent new approaches for protecting U.S. citizens
from gun violence." Id.
64 See supra note 59 (describing Supreme Court's willingness to uphold regulatory
taxes).
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B. Fifth Amendment Takings
Also intriguing is the issue of whether excessive taxation may
constitute a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, thus requiring
just compensation. 5 Assuming that the tax itself is constitutional,
does it deprive ammunition manufacturers of their private prop-
erty for a public use, and thereby require just compensation? His-
torical analysis indicates that this is a particularly unsettled area
of the law, requiring case-by-case analysis 66 and often "result[ing]
in confusion. "67
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,68 private prop-
erty cannot be taken from a person by the government for the ben-
efit of the public unless that person receives "just compensa-
tion."69 The Takings Clause illustrates the deference to private
property rights that exists throughout the Constitution.70 The
Supreme Court has frequently held that government may execute
laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values
without resulting in a taking.7 ' A taking results when three ele-
ments are present: 1) private property is taken;72 2) it is done by
the government and involves an otherwise constitutional pur-
65 See Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 433, 435 (1982) (arguing that "taxation and regulation are forms of takings"). For a
general discussion of whether restrictions on firearms of any sort can constitute a taking,
see Note, The Public Use Test: Would a Ban on the Possession of Firearms Require Just
Compensation?, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROas. 223, 230 (1986) [hereinafter Public Use Test].
66 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). But see
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding "per-
manent physical occupation of land" not subject to Penn Central ad hoc inquiry); Media
Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo. Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 906-07 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (holding that "permanent physical occupation of land" is taking per se), aft'd, 991
F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
67 Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
68 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
69 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
70 See JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. RrTNmA, CONs'rrrTIoNAL LAw § 11.11, at 424 (4th
ed. 1991). The authors describe the Just Compensation Clause as "built upon this concept
of a moral obligation to pay for government interference with private property." Id.
71 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (holding that landmark restrictions preventing
construction of 50-story office building atop historic landmark does not constitute taking);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (upholding restrictions effectively prohib-
iting sand and gravel mine); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1927) (upholding limits
on setback development of land); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (upholding lim-
its on development of air rights). The Court noted that it had "been unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government.. . ." Id. at 124.
72 See generally Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 226-27.
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pose;73 and 3) a public use is intended. 74 If any element is not sat-
isfied, then no compensable governmental taking has occurred.
Furthermore, these would be no requisite state action if a private
third party, and not government, appropriated the property.
Caselaw and scholarly works have rarely discussed the possibil-
ity of whether, as noted in McCray, the taxing power could be so
extreme as to be beyond the power conferred by the taxation
power.75 But because property rights include a reasonable return
on investment, 76 and extreme taxation interferes with such a re-
turn, even on a particular product, one may argue that a taking
could occur in this manner.77
1. Appropriations of Private Property
In order for private property to be "taken," the government
must physically appropriate property through possession or con-
fiscation.78 Alternatively, a taking can occur when the government
regulates the use of the property such that the property is sig-
nificantly reduced in value to the private owner or the governmen-
73 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 224. The Takings Clause, while applying to the
federal government, does not directly apply to the states. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Criti-
cal Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 McH. L. REv. 1892, 1892 n.1 (1992).
Takings jurisprudence is applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. (citing Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896)).
74 See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,230-31 (1984) (upholding use of
Hawaii's eminent domain power to reduce concentration of private property ownership as
valid "public use"); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954) (upholding District of Co-
lumbia Redevelopment Act as valid "public use"); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Ber-
nard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1905). "It is fundamental in American jurispru-
dence that private property cannot be taken by the Government, national or state, except
for purposes which are of a public character, although such taking be accompanied by com-
pensation to the owner." Id.
75 See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64 (1904).
76 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that valuable property rights of the appel-
lant were destroyed and that the term "property" addresses a "group of rights inhering in
[ownership] ... ." Id. at 142 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945)). This group of rights, according to Justice Rehnquist, 'denote[s] the group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dis-
pose of it ... the constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen
may possess." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-
78). In Penn Central, the "air rights" of the owner were deemed property rights. 438 U.S. at
143 n.5.
77 Cf Epstein, supra note 65, at 436 (describing taxation and regulation as partial tak-
ings and focusing on degree of confiscation in order to determine compensation).
78 See supra notes 65-66 (discussing possessory or confiscatory takings).
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tal activity interferes with distinct, investment-backed
expectations.7 9
A possessory taking occurs when government declares an act of
appropriation to be "in the public interest" and then physically
takes control of the property. 0 Title to the property changes
hands or, at the least, physical possession is transferred from one
to the other."' In the matter of taxation, no possessory taking is
alleged, since the tax is regulatory in nature."2
Regulatory takings require no physical appropriation of prop-
erty. 3 The manner of taking depends on the reasonable, quantifi-
able value of the private property at issue, before and after gov-
ernment regulation,84 or what the owner could reasonably expect
as a return on their investment.8 5 In this context, the concept of
79 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Court noted that: "[A] 'taking' may more read-
ily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical inva-
sion by government... than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. For a further
discussion of possessory takings, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994)
(striking down city ordinance requiring dedication of public greenway and bicycle path
without showing of "essential nexus" between legitimate state interest and ordinance);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. For more on regulatory takings, see also Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
80 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 233; see also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20. In
determining the appropriate relationship between state interest and state action, the Court
stated:
[A] term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to be the re-
quirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the [imposing authority] must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
[proposal] ....
Id.
81 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 226; see also FRED BosszLMAN ET AL., THE TAK-
ING ISSUE 51 (1973) (describing requirement of change of physical possession).
82 See LEE, supra note 45, at 4.
83 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (discussing
takings as "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good").
84 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 228. There has never been a Supreme Court
holding that a finding of "diminution in value" was sufficient to warrant a taking claim. Id.
Therefore, it is unclear what threshold is required to trigger a valid claim. Id. at 246. The
only guidance from the Court was offered by Justice Holmes, who stated: "[W]hile property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Further, the Court
later noted that it did not "embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless
government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." Id. at 122 n.25; see
also Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 229. The Note combines the "Physical Invasion
Test," the "Diminution in Value Test," the "Noxious Use Test," and the "Police Power Test"
into one all-encompassing test, "The Public Use Test." Id.
85 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist noted that:
"[Tihe Court has frequently held that, even where a destruction of property rights would
not otherwise constitute a taking, the inability of the owner to make a reasonable return on
his property requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment." Id. (citing United States
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takings applies equally to personal property, as well as real
property. 6
2. Public Use Requirements
Assuming the government action element of a takings inquiry
has been satisfied,87 the public use element then must be consid-
ered. Because government regulations are usually established
upon the finding of a public need, they are frequently given a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, even if the regulations affect the
value of private property. 8 When there is no valid public interest
supporting the statute, however, the act is illegal on its face.
8 9
3. Application of Supreme Court Tests to Moynihan Proposal
The Supreme Court has applied the three elements of takings
by utilizing four different tests. They are: 1) the "Physical Inva-
sion Test," which would involve the government appropriating pri-
vate property and physically taking possession of the property;90
2) the "Police Power Test," in which the legislature would have to
announce a finding that the action of appropriating the property
would further the "health, morals and safety of the people";91 3)
the "Diminution in Value Test," which raises the possibility that
an otherwise legitimate regulation could become so onerous as to
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. at 470). Rehnquist also argued that merely allowing a reasonable use of
property did not preclude a taking. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149.
86 See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1183-84 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(upholding village ordinance statute which banned possession of firearms, with limited ex-
ceptions, within village limits), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983). Because this Note is concerned with taxation, no physical appropriation is
discussed.
87 Cf Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 225.
88 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (stating that land use regulations which "destroyed
or adversely affected recognized property interests" would be upheld if "health, safety,
morals, or general welfare" were promoted by such governmental action); see also Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Justice Holmes noted: "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." Id.
89 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 (1994).
90 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 226. The "Physical Invasion Test" was applied
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 149, 175 n.8 (1952) (holding limitations on
owner's right to exclude others constituted taking).
91 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (upholding state's power to prohibit
manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages without requirement of compensation to brew-
ery owner); see also Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 231. In state actions, the legal exer-
cise of the police power does not constitute a compensable taking. Id. at 230. While Con-
gress has no police power to exercise, Congress may enact laws pursuant to its enumerated
powers through its taxing power which resemble the police power of the states. Id. at 239.
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lessen the value of the property and require just compensation;92
and 4) the "Noxious Use Test," which, coupled with the "Police
Power Test," allows the government to abate public nuisances."3
In analyzing the Moynihan proposal in the context of each of the
tests above, it would seem that the "Physical Invasion Test" would
not apply, since the ammunition companies cannot claim that the
federal government has taken over their factories. In addition,
under the "Police Power Test," it would seem that no taking would
occur, unless, as stated above, the rate of taxation is so extreme as
to exceed Congress's taxation authority. 94
Assuming that the diminution of value can be proved, however,
as a result of the 10,000 percent tax rate on certain types of bul-
lets, then it is possible that a compensable taking could occur.
Even then, it would be an open question whether the diminution
in value of the means of production could not be recouped by con-
verting to the manufacture of other less taxable forms of ammuni-
tion.93 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that a taking would
occur under this standard.
Finally, under the "Noxious Use Test," the question would focus
on whether these deadly forms of ammunition constitute a public
nuisance.9s It would seem that such bullets are indeed nuisances
due to their killing capacity.9"
92 See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (upholding regulations effec-
tively restricting operation of sand and gravel mine); see also Public Use Test, supra note
65, at 246. This test also includes the "distinct investment-backed expectation" analysis.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
93 See Public Use Test, supra note 65, at 233. This test is usually used in connection with
the "Police Power Test." Id. These so-called evil avoidance measures are closely aligned
with the idea of public nuisance. See Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 576 (1913) (hold-
ing that destruction of potentially unwholesome milk abated public nuisance and did not
require compensation).
94 See generally supra note 59 (discussing Supreme Court's general inclination to sup-
port regulatory taxes).
95 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. The Court held that New York City law permitted
Penn Central "not only to profit from the [current use] but also to obtain a 'reasonable
return' on its investment" and did not 'interfere with Penn Central's primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel." Id. In addition, the Court held that the return Penn
Central could realize from the sale of their "transferable development-rights" helped miti-
gate the financial burden of such landmark restrictions. Id. at 137.
Generally, a regulation is a taking only if it "denies an owner economically viable use" of
the property. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). In all likelihood, a
conversion from producing one form of ammunition to another would still render a reason-
able return on distinct investment-backed expectations.
96 See LEE, supra note 45, at 5 (noting it is within government's power to regulate gen-
eral welfare).
97 See supra note 28 (discussing Talon's deadly capacity).
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The Moynihan proposal is legally sufficient on its face. The
Moynihan proposal may require, however, too much in the way of
ad hoc analysis of which bullets are currently popular and, there-
fore, used in gun-related violence.98 Some authorities argue that
more analysis of ballistics is necessary to address the longterm
needs of ammunition control. 99 As a result, the Moynihan propo-
sal may only be the first step towards what is really needed: a
comprehensive ban on civilian sales of all handguns and handgun
ammunition.'
00
II. STRICT LIABIrrY FOR AMMUNITION
The assertion that manufacturers of firearms and ammunition
should be held strictly liable for the injuries that result from the
use of their products has been a recent and innovative trend in the
areas of gun control and products liability.' 0 ' Such assertions,
while generally unsuccessful in the courts, 0 2 nevertheless have
appeal on many levels'03 and should be considered as viable steps
toward reducing gun-related violence. Most caselaw and commen-
tary in this area consider strict liability for firearms, 04 while am-
munition is addressed only in passing, if at all. 10 5 Arguments for
98 See Dailard, supra note 3, at 33-35.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 37.
101 See, e.g., Boser, supra note 1, at 314; Andrew J. McClurg, Handguns as Products
Unreasonably Unsafe Per Se, 13 U. ARK LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 599, 603 (1991); Andrew 0.
Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as Abnormally Danger-
ous Activity, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 369, 370, 375-76 (1987); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to
Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common-Law Approach, 51 FoiHAM L. REV. 771, 783(1983). But see Oliver, supra note 30, at 2. The author argues: "Simply stated, a well-made
handgun is free from defect." Id.
102 See, e.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920, 928 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding no
"Saturday Night Special" theory strict liability against manufacturer and distributor of
handgun used in Presidential assassination attempt); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F.
Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding no strict products liability against manufacturer
and distributor of automatic pistol used in attack on decedent); Addison v. Williams, 546
So. 2d 220, 223-25 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding no strict product liability or ultrahazardous
activity liability existed against rifle manufacturer and ammunition manufacturer for per-
sonal injuries suffered in criminal assault).
103 See supra note 101 (discussing benefits of strict liability for handgun manufacturers
and suppliers).
104 See supra note 101 (discussing merits of strict liability of handgun manufacturers
and suppliers).
105 See Dailard, supra note 3, at 19. The author notes: "Since the birth of national fire-
arms policy in 1934, Congress has neither adopted nor proposed any primary gun control
strategy based on the regulation of ammunition. Id. Courts have only addressed strict lia-
bility for ammunition while in the process of rejecting strict liability for firearms. See Addi-
son v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 225 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Similarly, commentators have not
focused upon ammunition in their discussions of strict liability. See supra note 101 (dis-
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and against strict liability for ammunition, however, can be analo-
gized to those addressing firearm liability. 10 6
Strict liability has evolved in the United States in an effort to
spread the costs of injuries caused by certain activities among
those who are best able to internalize and bear such costs.10 7 Over
the years, the courts have slowly expanded the activities which
trigger strict liability in tort for injuries to others.'10 In addition to
the expansive judicial view of common-law strict liability, Con-
gress and many state legislatures have enacted statutes applying
strict liability in many situations. 09
There are two primary theories that give legal foundation to the
imposition of strict liability. 110 The first is strict products liabil-
ity,"' which requires a prima facie showing of "design defect"" 2
cussing merits of strict liability of handgun manufacturers and suppliers, without discus-
sion of ammunition manufacturers and suppliers).
106 Cf McClurg, supra note 101, at 611-16 (discussing handgun strict liability).
107 See Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.) (holding that
defectively made howitzer round may allow for strict products liability cause of action, even
if production is under government's control), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
The court noted "Itjhe purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries result-
ing from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 512
F.2d at 84 (quoting Greenbaum v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963));
see also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (asserting that, under Illinois law, sale of handguns to public did
not constitute ultrahazardous activity giving rise to strict liability). Judge Cudahy noted:
Strict liability for the manufacturer or marketer of handguns ... places the costs of
injury on a party who is able to spread those costs widely among all users through
higher prices. An argument can be made for thus internalizing the costs in the price of
handguns and thereby distributing them to all users rather than imposing them on
shooting victims, which is the alternative.
Id.
108 See infra notes 156-58 (discussing court-imposed extensions of strict liability).
109 See Boser, supra note 1, at 328. The author cites as examples U.C.C. § 3-420 (1977),
which makes a bank strictly liable for cashing fraudulent checks on the accounts of custom-
ers. Boser, supra, at 328. In addition, the author discusses federal statutes holding the
creators of pollution absolutely liable for their waste, no matter who is responsible for its
spillage. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1986).
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 402A (1977) (product liability); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 519-520 (1977) (ultrahazardous activity). For further discussion of
each, see infra notes 111, 114.
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). This section states, in pertinent
part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2)
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
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and the application of a "risk/utility test."113 The second theory
imposes liability for injuries resulting from "ultrahazardous activ-
ities,"114 requiring a balancing between the cost of the injury and
the utility of the activity to the community. 115 In the context of
gun control, neither approach has proven successful to any signifi-
cant degree in federal or state court," 6 despite their acclaim in
academic circles." 7 Either the ultrahazardous activity or the
products liability approaches, however, can be enacted by state
legislatures or adopted by courts.
A. Products Liability Doctrine
Under the doctrine of strict products liability, courts and com-
mentators alike have been generally unwilling to impose liability
by declaring a firearm, as designed, defective without proof of an
actual defect."" The difficulties arise in the courts' initial analysis
of the common-law definition of products liability. 1 9 The courts
have held uniformly that in order to apply a "risk/utility" analy-
112 See id. § 402A(1).
113 Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 223-224 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding no strict
products liability without product "defect"). The court noted "tihere must be 'something
wrong' with a product before the risk/utility analysis may be applied in determining
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous or defective." Id.
114 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). "Abnormally dangerous activ-
ity" is a term of art employed in the 1977 version of the Restatement. Id. § 519. Since then,
the term "ultrahazardous activity" has come to be used to describe the threshold question
of the activity's risk. See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th
Cir. 1984). A risk/benefit balance is then addressed. See infra note 115; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. h (1977). For the purposes of this Note, the two are synonymous,
though this Note will utilize the phrase "ultrahazardous activity" wherever necessary. See
infra note 137 (quoting text of § 520).
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. f (1977). See infra note 152 (quoting
text of comment 0.
116 See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding sale of handguns did not constitute ultrahazardous activity and, therefore, no lia-
bility against handgun manufacturer in death of another); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore
Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1018 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding district court's application of Georgia
law, which found no strict liability in tort against manufacturer of grenade). But see Rich-
man v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 208 (E.D. La. 1983) (holding that sale of
nondefective gun could constitute ultrahazardous activity under Louisiana law).
117 See Smith, supra note 101, at 370. The author makes the case for applying § 402A of
the Restatement of Torts to handgun manufacturers. Id.; see also McClurg, supra note 101,
at 611-16. The author argues application of § 402A leads inevitably to the classification of
guns as unreasonably dangerous per se. Id.
118 See Boser, supra note 1, at 323 n.97.
119 See Boser, supra note 1, at 325 n.93. The Restatement requires the product to be sold
in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous . " See REsTATEmEN (SEcoND) Or
Tomrs § 402A(1) (1977).
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sis, 120 the courts must first find that the product is, in fact, defec-
tive. 121 Plaintiffs normally respond by alleging a design defect in
order to reach the "risk/utility" threshold, 122 but courts consist-
ently have rejected this approach, ruling that unless the firearm
or ammunition misfires in some way, they are deemed to have
functioned properly, exactly as designed. 12 Accordingly, it is un-
likely that strict products liability would afford protection to the
victims of gun-related violence on any level.
B. Ultrahazardous Activity Doctrine
After determining whether an activity may be deemed ul-
trahazardous, courts apply a balancing test in determining
whether injuries resulting from the activity merit the imposition
of strict liability.124 Generally, courts analyze six criteria in such a
balance. 125 The first criterion is whether there is a high risk of
harm to the plaintiff.12 6 A logical conclusion would be that hand-
gun ammunition, which, like the handgun itself is easily hidden
and extremely lethal, certainly creates a high probability of
harm.127 Second, there should be a likelihood that the resulting
harm will be great.12 8 In the case of handgun ammunition, the
120 See Oliver, supra note 30, at 3 (noting principles of product liability law require de-
fect before liability is imposed); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973) (describing implication that something be wrong
with product in order to apply strict product liability).
121 See Smith, supra note 101, at 375. There are three forms of defects the courts gener-
ally recognize: (1) Manufacturing defects of the type not characteristic of other products
like it; (2) failure of a duty to warn; and (3) unsafe design defect. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984).
122 See Boser, supra note 1, at 328 n.93 (describing plaintiffs' attempts to reach "risk/
utility" balancing test).
123 See, e.g., Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,
849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
124 See RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
125 Id. § 520. That section provides the following six criteria:
(a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) Likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) Extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(M Extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id.
126 RE STATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (1977).
127 See Smith, supra note 101, at 393-94; Turley, supra note 9, at 43 (describing
probability of harm).
128 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(b) (1977).
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typical harm tends to be death or grave physical injury. 129 Third,
the activity must be one in which the actor is unable to eliminate
the risk, even if due care were employed. 13 0 Such is clearly the
case with handgun ammunition due to its strong potential to do
harm. 13 1 The fourth criterion questions whether the activity is
commonly used. 13 2 The focus is whether the manufacture and dis-
tribution of ammunition is a common practice or whether these
activities would seem to be relatively uncommon, since few compa-
nies are in the business of ammunition manufacturing. 133 Next, it
must be determined whether the particular usage is inappropriate
to the place where it is conducted. 134 Arguably, this criterion deals
more with relative context than with physical location.' 3 5 As a re-
sult, the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as
whether ammunition is used at a firing range or on the street,
would indicate whether the activity is appropriate.' 3 6 It would
seem that the use of ammunition is never an appropriate commu-
nity activity among the general public, even when justifiable in
self-defense or police actions. Finally, the courts analyze whether
the activity's value to the community is outweighed by the danger
it presents.' 3 7 The danger posed by handgun ammunition far out-
weighs its purported value. 1 8 It should be noted that not all six
criteria must be satisfied in order to impose strict liability. 1 9
129 See Smith, supra note 101, at 394. The author argues that the consequence of impos-
ing strict liability on high-risk activities is to reduce the level of that activity, thereby re-
ducing the social cost of the activity. Id.
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (1977).
131 See Smith, supra note 101, at 394. Comment h in the Restatement describes how most
ordinary activities can be made entirely safe by the taking of all reasonable precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToiRrs § 520 cmt. h (1977). A handgun, Smith argues, can never
be made entirely safe, since it is intended to fire ammunition at great velocity at its target.
Smith, supra, at 394.
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977).
133 See Smith, supra note 101, at 394-95. The author notes that, in 1979, 16 handgun
manufacturers accounted for 96.5% of all nonmilitary handgun production. Id. at 370.
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e) (1977).
135 See Smith, supra note 101, at 397 n.130. According to the author, location itself does
not have to be a factor in determining the context of the activity. "The reasons for imposing
[strict] liability on those who have created a grave risk of harm... are largely independent
of considerations of locational appropriateness." Id. (citing Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978)).
136 See Smith, supra note 101, at 397.
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1977).
138 See Smith, supra note 101, at 398. The author argues that "[w]hile some handguns
such as police revolvers may have external [third party] benefits, by and large guns sold to
the general public benefit only their owners." Id.
139 Id. at 398. The Restatement of Torts notes:
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Courts have been reluctant to extend the ultrahazardous activ-
ity doctrine to the manufacture and sale of guns and ammuni-
tion.140 Some courts have reasoned that the doctrine has only been
applied to matters involving land use.1 41 In addition, courts have
distinguished the "marketing" of a handgun from its "use,"'4 2
while still others refuse to extend the doctrine to "common usage"
activities. 143
Moreover, a number of courts have objected to the application of
the ultrahazardous activity liability to handgun and ammunition
manufacturers on the ground that if it were applied to such manu-
facturers, it may also apply to manufacturers of other potentially
dangerous products, such as alcohol, tobacco, kitchen knives, and
automobiles.144 In addition, the courts have appeared unwilling to
extend the theory into areas where the federal and state legisla-
tures generally have not ventured. 145
The argument has been made, however, that courts' refusal to
extend the ultrahazardous activities doctrine to the manufacture
and sale of handguns is a clear mistake. 146 Factors such as loca-
tion in land use matters, 147 distinctions among manufacturing,
[Tihe factors... are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is
not necessarily sufficient of itself... and ordinarily several of them will be required for
strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present,
especially if others weigh heavily.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
140 See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir.
1986) (applying Florida law); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1266-67 (5th Cir.
1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (apply-
ing Illinois law); Riordin v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (M1. App.
Ct. 1985); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Md. 1985); Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). But see Richman v.
Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 208-09 (E.D. La. 1983) (applying strict liability in
wrongful death action), overruled by Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
141 See Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147 (holding that ultrahazardous activity doctrine only ex-
tends to land use under Maryland law).
142 See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting marketing of handgun distinct
from use of same); Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204 (same).
143 See Smith, supra note 101, at 388 (citing Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1265 n.43).
144 Smith, supra note 101, at 388 (citing Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1269; Martin, 743 F.2d at
1204).
145 Smith, supra note 101, at 388-89 (citing Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1912, 1924-27 (1984)); see also Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206,
1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that it would be "unwise" for courts and juries to restrict
handguns when legislatures have remained silent).
146 See Smith, supra note 101, at 388-89; cf Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products
Liability, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 1103, 1150 (1991) (questioning courts' reluctance to expand
strict liability for handguns, since courts have previously expanded strict liability to in-
clude many products, such as foods, medicine, blood, clothes, toys, tools, machines, and
automobiles).
147 See Smith, supra note 101, at 397 n.130.
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sale and use, 14" and common usage149 do not support an outright
refusal to extend the doctrine. 150 Further, there are several distin-
guishing characteristics between guns and other products, 15 1 and
it is exactly because many legislatures have failed to address such
a theory that the courts should intervene. 15 2
A strong case can be made for applying the ultrahazardous ac-
tivity doctrine of strict liability to the manufacture and sale of
handguns. 5 ' While handguns in general would be subject to strict
liability under such an argument, ammunition, particularly the
types which are intended to inflict injuries beyond the injuries cre-
ated by "normal" bullets, 154 should also require strict liability for
damages under the doctrine of ultrahazardous activities.
The standards for determining the particular forms of ammuni-
tion warranting such strict liability should be flexible. Such stan-
dards should include: the manner in which the ammunition is
marketed, medical testimony as to the potential dangers of this
form of ammunition as opposed to others, and the availability of
the ammunition outside the realm of law enforcement and mili-
tary fields.15
148 See id. at 388. Smith describes the distinction as "one without a difference." Id. While
it is true that the use of pesticides, gasoline, and other products have been held in strict
liability, the manufacture and distribution can also be held to be an ultrahazardous activ-
ity. See Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Ark. 1949) (holding manu-
facturer of pesticide strictly liable for selling the product). The author argues that in es-
sence, 'the court held the manufacturer responsible for 'casting into the air' this harmful
pesticide because it had sold the dangerous product." Id.
149 See Smith, supra note 101, at 384.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 400. For example, the author argues that strict liability should only be ex-
tended to innocent third parties injured by handguns, so the tobacco analogy does not ap-
ply, since a smoker only harms himself, absent further evidence of "second-hand smoke."
Id. As to the alcohol, automobile, and knife analogies, the author argues that both are
"common usage" items and their value to the community far outweighs the risk they create.
Id. See also Paul R. Bonney, Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Iruries: An
Economic Analysi8, 73 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1460 (1985) (noting handguns' unusual characteris-
tics as distinguished from other products).
152 Smith, supra note 101, at 389.
153 See id. at 379-405.
154 See Smothers, supra note 30, at 22. Whereas the "normal" .22 caliber bullet slug
penetrates the body relatively straight and clean, the Talon, for example, is intended to
create a wider hole and its jagged edges are intended to cut tissue and inflict more damage.
Id.; see also Dailard, supra note 3, at 27. The author discusses the Law Enforcement Of-
ficers' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-408, 100 Stat. 920 (1986), which banned the manufac-
ture, importation, and sale of armor-piercing bullets. Dailard, supra, at 26. Such bullets as
the Talon, and the recently outlawed armor-piercing bullets clearly seem to be intended to
mutilate and cause profound injury and trauma to the human body. See supra note 28.
155 See Dailard, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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Courts have seen fit to expand the theory of ultrahazardous ac-
tivities to include the storage and use of explosives, 156 cropdust-
ing,157 and many other activities.'5 8 It would seem logical, there-
fore, that the manufacturers and sellers of certain bullets should
have imposed upon them, by either the courts or the legislature,
higher costs commensurate to the burdens imposed upon victims
of gun violence in terms of increased health expenses and other
costs. 159
C. Court-Imposed "Saturday Night Special" Liability
An additional means of imposing strict liability upon ammuni-
tion manufacturers and sellers is available. Court-imposed exten-
sions of strict liability, on the basis of evolving common law, would
address the more egregious examples of ammunition specifically
intended to maim and kill, 160 without expanding either the ul-
trahazardous activity or strict products liability doctrines. 161 In
Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc.,162 the Maryland Court of Appeals
rejected both of these doctrines and instead applied strict liability
in tort on the grounds that "Saturday Night Special" handguns
were not covered in prior legislative policy matters and had no
legitimate societal purpose. 63 The court reasoned that public pol-
icy would not be served by extending Maryland's statutory right to
bear arms so broadly.' 6 The Maryland Court of Appeals effec-
tively created a new, albeit narrow and ambiguous, area of strict
liability. 65 The Maryland Legislature, however, enacted legisla-
156 Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978)
(finding strict liability for storage of explosives, even in remote area).
157 Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977) (holding cropduster
strictly liable for spraying pesticides on adjoining property).
158 See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972) (transporting and storage
of gasoline is abnormally dangerous activity requiring strict liability). This Note does not
address the myriad of criminal strict liability statutes enacted by the legislatures and up-
held by the courts.
159 Smith, supra note 101, at 393. Smith estimates the costs of handgun death and inju-
ries to be approximately $20 billion (citing Turley, supra note 9, at 43).
160 See supra note 28 (describing lethal effects of Talon ammunition).
161 See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147-49 (Md. 1985).
162 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
163 Id. at 1154-58. Due to the general lack of worth of the "Saturday Night Special," the
court held that the manufacturers "know or ought to know" that their products were being
used primarily for criminal activity. Id. at 1158-59.
164 Id at 1159.
165 Id, at 1159-60. The court noted that "tihere is no clear-cut, established definition of a
Saturday Night Special .... " Id. at 1159. The court then proceeded to include a list of
factors which should enter into a jury determination of whether the handgun qualified as a
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tion five years later which essentially overruled the holding in
Kelley. 166
One of the main criticisms of the Kelley holding centered around
the fact that the court offered little in the way of solid criteria for
what constituted a "Saturday Night Special. " 16 7 Instead, the court
left the decision of whether a gun was a "Saturday Night Special"
to the jury for a case-by-case determination. 16
Perhaps as a result of Kelley's arguable shortcomings, no court
since has attempted to expand strict liability in this area. The
United States District Court for Washington, D.C. specifically re-
jected the "Saturday Night Special" theory in Delahanty v. Hinck-
ley,169 a case arising out of the attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan. 1 70 In spite of the holding in Delahanty, the
rationale of Kelley could be viewed as an alternative form of strict
liability, particularly for forms of ammunition deemed to have no
"legitimate societal purpose."17 1 As applied to more damaging
forms of ammunition, 172 it seems such a holding would be legally
plausible.
D. Statutory Strict Liability
Finally, another alternative would be the enactment of statutes
declaring the public policy of the state or municipality to be favor-
ing holding manufacturers of certain weapons and ammunition
strictly liable for the use of their products. 178 In the case of Wash-
ington, D.C.'s Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act
of 1990 (the "Act"),174 the City Council enacted legislation making
the manufacturers and dealers of nine military-style weapons
strictly liable for the use of their firearms resulting in bodily in-
"Saturday Night Special." These factors included barrel length, concealability, cost, quality
of materials and manufacture, accuracy, and reliability. Id. at 1159-60.
166 See WnDLE TuRLEY & JAMEs E. RooKs, JR., FIREARMS LITIGATION: LAw, SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE 320 (1988).
167 See Susan M. Stevens, Note, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: When Hard Cases Make Good
Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 486, 492 (1987) (discussing possible alternatives to the case-by-case
analysis required under Kelley).
168 Id.
169 686 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1986).
170 Id. at 928.
171 See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985).
172 See supra note 28 (describing Talon ammunition).
173 See Boser, supra note 1, at 341-44. The author argues that legislation imposing strict
liability is good public policy, allowing effective enforcement of gun laws, saving lives, and
making the innocent victims of crime whole. Id.
174 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2391 to 6-2393 (Supp. 1994).
1994]
260 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:235
jury or death to innocent third parties.175 After the City Council
repealed the bill,' 76 a referendum was held and the law was
reinstituted. 17
7
Although Washington, D.C. has enacted a statute to create
strict liability, several states have enacted legislation which ex-
pressly prohibits such strict liability.1 7 8 The general intent of
these laws seems to be to deprive the courts of the power to ex-
pand strict liability to firearms or ammunition, whether under the
theories of ultrahazardous activities, strict products liability, or a
Kelley-type holding.179 There appears to be, however, few limita-
tions on a legislature's ability to carve out new areas of strict lia-
bility concerning firearms and ammunition. The federal govern-
ment, exercising its power under the Commerce Clause, 8 0 also
would be able to expand strict liability, just as it has on other
issues.' 8 '
CONCLUSION
The courts have given Congress broad latitude in its ability to
tax whatever it wishes, at whatever rate it desires. The courts
also have allowed state and federal governments freedom to deter-
mine the proper use of their regulatory powers. Therefore, the
Moynihan proposal to tax certain forms of ammunition out of
175 Id. § 6-2392. The Act also held strictly liable the manufacturers of each of the listed
assault weapons for the injuries resulting from their weapons. Id.
176 Rene Sanchez, Dixon Prepared to Scuttle Gun Law to Secure Hill Aid, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1991, at D1.
177 See Boser, supra note 1, at 315, n.17. "Seventy percent of those voting approved the
referendum to stop the repeal of the Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of
1990." Id. (citing Staff of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., Council Act 8-289 and Acts to Repeal (Comm. Print) (Nov. 21, 1991)).
178 See CAL. Cv. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985). The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) ... [N]o firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis
that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential
to cause serious injury, damage or death....
(b) for purposes of this statute: (1) The potential of a firearm to cause serious physical
injury, damage, or death... does not make the product defective in design.
(2) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or ammunition are
not proximately caused by its potential to cause serious physical injury, damage, or
death, but are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the product....
Id. Other states, including Colorado, see CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-501 (West 1989),
Idaho, see IDAHo CODE § 6-1410 (1990), Kentucky, see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.155(1991), Montana, see MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-720 (1990), and North Carolina, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99B-11 (1991), have also enacted similar statutes.
179 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
18o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
181 See supra notes 156-58.
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existence is constitutionally and legally sound. Senator Moyni-
han's intention to tax certain forms of ammunition at one rate and
others at another rate, however, may not prove effective in ad-
dressing the problem of gun-related violence.
Coupling the Moynihan proposal with some form of legislative
expansion of strict liability, particularly on similarly dangerous
forms of ammunition, would effectively serve two interests. On
the one hand, the innocent victims of gun-related violence would
be made whole by those who profit from the sale of ammunition,
the manufacturers and sellers, both on a personal level through
tort liability and on a national level through increased tax reve-
nues. An additional benefit of the combined proposals would be
the elimination of certain types of ammunition which serve only
as a more efficient means of killing. Supplementing legislation, or
in lieu of legislation, courts should step in and impose a broader
definition of strict liability, particularly one that incorporates the
ultrahazardous activity doctrine. By allowing flexibility in deal-
ing with ammunition, the United States can begin to stem the tide
of gun-related violence.
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